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Religion, Support of Equal Rights for Same-Sex Couples and the Australian National 
Vote on Marriage Equality 
 
Abstract: In 2017, the Australian Government commissioned a national vote on same-sex 
marriage legislation, which elicited substantial debates dominated by religious voices. We 
examine the associations between religious identification, importance of religion to one’s life 
and frequency of attendance at religious services and support for same-sex couples in such a 
unique context. We contribute to knowledge by (i) systematically examining these 
relationships in a country other than the US (Australia) using high-quality, nationally-
representative panel data spanning 2005-2015 (Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia Survey; n=44,794 observations/18,384 individuals), (ii) assessing the degree of intra-
group heterogeneity in views towards equal rights, and (iii) considering how religiosity 
modifies the effects of other socio-structural factors. We find high degrees of between- and 
within-group heterogeneity in support of equal rights for same-sex couples, and large 
religiosity gradients. Furthermore, religiosity suppresses the liberalising effects on attitudes of 
historical time, education, socio-economic background, and city residence. 
 
  
 
 
BACKGROUND 
Recent debates about recognising same-sex marriage provide a site for the examination of the 
role of religion in the public sphere. Australia provides a unique opportunity, having recently 
conducted a national vote to gauge public opinion on same-sex marriage. While the presence 
of religious voices in public policy debates in Australia have been consistent, the 2017 
Australian national ballot on marriage equality emerged as an arena where religious 
communities actively attempted to dictate what was to happen in the wider society. Religious 
groups, who in 2016 conducted fewer than 25% of weddings, actively campaigned to limit 
marriage to heterosexual couples for the whole of society – even though they were (and are) 
able to privately refuse to marry such couples. This paper offers a discussion of the role of 
religion in recent debates about same-sex marriage in Australia. Using a large, nationally 
representative panel study, it provides a detailed analysis of whether and how the views 
promoted by religious groups resonate with the views reported by individuals who identify 
with those religions. Specifically, we assess the importance of individual-level variables such 
as religious identification, religious participation and importance of religion as predictors of 
support of equal rights for same-sex couples. We make three key contributions to the literature. 
First, we draw detailed attitude comparisons amongst highly disaggregated religious groups in 
a new and interesting country context, Australia. In doing so, we question the universality of 
theories and findings from the US, where the bulk of the research has taken place, and tease 
out the importance of institutional context (Adamczyk 2017). Second, we discuss and test the 
degree of intra-group heterogeneity in attitudes to same-sex couples, which we take as a proxy 
for denominational subcultures (Gay et al. 1996). Third, using a ‘complex religion’ framework 
(Wilde and Glassman 2016), we consider how religiosity intersects with other social locations 
in structuring attitudes towards same-sex couples. 
Attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ Issues: Religion Matters 
 
 
A breadth of international research, dominated by US studies, documents associations between 
individuals’ religious identification, attendance and importance and negative attitudes towards 
LGBTIQ+ issues (Gay et al. 2015; Sherkat et al. 2010; Whitley 2009). There is also well-
established variation across religious groups. In the US, comparatively unsupportive views 
have been documented amongst evangelical and sectarian Protestants (e.g. Baptist, Pentecostal, 
Churches of Christ), and comparatively more supportive views amongst Jews, Catholics and 
mainline Protestants (Gay et al. 2015; Perry and Whitehead, 2016; Schnabel, 2016; Sherkat 
2017). Non-US studies remain scarce, but a cross-national literature is developing. A recent 
analysis of 87 countries by Adamczyk (2017) revealed that Protestants, Muslims and Hindus 
held the most unsupportive attitudes towards homosexuality, Jews, Catholics and unaffiliated 
people the most supportive, and Buddhists and Eastern Orthodox Christians fell in the middle. 
Adamczyk (2017) provides an excellent overview of the theoretical mechanisms underpinning 
these empirical associations. From a moral-philosophical-theological viewpoint, an important 
factor is that members of religious groups support social issues that align with the teachings 
and values of their faith, and – at face value – religious texts often portray homosexuality in a 
negative way. For example, the Christian Bible’s Old Testament condemns same-sex relations 
as ‘detestable’ and meriting death penalty, the Islamic Qur’an depicts them as ‘transgressive’ 
and ‘problematic’, and the Hindu Vinaya as requiring penance (Adamczyk 2017: 18-19). 
Consistent with this, negative attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues are partially driven by literal 
interpretation of religious scriptures, and beliefs about biblical inerrancy (see e.g. Gay et al. 
2015; Perry and Whitehead 2016). The influence of a religious group on the attitudes of its 
members is contingent on its ability to socialize them into its moral values and instigate 
conformity, e.g. via sanctioning deviance and other social control processes. Higher levels of 
attendance at religious services expose individuals to sites in which religious teachings about 
same-sex relations being sinful or immoral are reinforced, and to greater surveillance by 
 
 
religious leaders and other congregants; they also reduce the amount of time and effort that 
they can exert socializing in other circles where more supportive attitudes are normative 
(Scheitle and Adamczyk 2009). This may explain why high levels of attendance lead to less 
supportive attitudes about LGBTIQ+ issues. Likewise, religious importance plays a pivotal 
role in shaping attitudes, not just because it promotes attendance, but also because it reflects 
the degree of internalization of the group’s moral values. As Wilde and Glassman (2016: 408) 
put it “religion brings about powerful forces of socialization, pedagogy and ritual”. 
Religion and Attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ Issues: The Australian Case 
The vast majority of the available evidence on the associations between religion, religiosity 
and LGBTIQ+ issues comes from the US. This is a significant shortcoming, as the US is 
regarded as ‘exceptional’ by many sociologists of religion, having a much higher rate of church 
attendance and a religious profile dominated by evangelical and charismatic Protestants 
(Berger et al. 2008). For reasons detailed below, Australia constitutes an interesting 
comparator. Yet Australian studies considering how religious identity and religiosity relate to 
attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues are scarce and methodologically lacking. Using data from 
a panel study of young Australians (Social Futures and Life Pathways Project, n=1,836), Smith 
(2016) found that the importance of religion was a significant predictor of opposition to same-
sex marriage. Similarly, using data from waves 1 and 3 of the Australian Longitudinal Study 
of Health and Relationships (2004-2005 & 2006-2007, n=4,884), Patrick et al. (2013) found 
that religious attendance was associated with disapproval of homosexual behaviour. Using data 
from a sample of Australians recruited through online social media (n=137), Anderson et al. 
(2017) found that people who identified as religious (using a ‘yes/no’ question) were less likely 
to support same-sex marriage. Consistent with this, Sloane and Robillard (2017) found that 
religious importance was negatively related to support of same-sex marriage in an online 
sample of students (n=430). These studies generally feature small or non-representative online 
 
 
or community samples, which prevents comparing the wide diversity of Australian religious 
groups and generalizing their findings. A first contribution of this study is to expand the 
international evidence to Australia using high-quality panel data from a national sample, which 
allow us to dissect differences in attitudes across finely differentiated religious denominations 
and individuals reporting different degrees of religiosity. Based on our review of the literature, 
we hypothesise that in the Australian context: less supportive attitudes towards same-sex 
couples will be found amongst those identifying with a religion (Hypothesis 1a) or express 
higher levels of religiosity (Hypothesis 1b). We also predict that there will be substantial 
heterogeneity in support across different religions, with individuals who identify with 
fundamentalist/sectarian Christian groups or Islam expected to hold the most traditional 
attitudes (Hypothesis 2).  
Denominational Subcultures: Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Attitudes 
A second contribution of this study is to conceptualize and demonstrate the existence of 
patterned intra-group heterogeneity across religious groups in attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ 
issues, as a first step in quantitatively demonstrating the existence of denominational 
subcultures. Research has established that the average degree of support towards socio-political 
issues, such as premarital sex, abortion, or same-sex relations, varies across religious groups. 
A shortcoming of this body of evidence is the coarse classifications used to measure religious 
groups. US scholarship on attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues typically compares the 7 groups 
contained within Steensland and colleagues’ (2000) RELTRAND classification (see e.g. Gay 
et al. 2015; Schnabel 2016). The situation is similar in cross-national comparisons; e.g. 
Adamczyk’s (2017) analyses of World Values Survey data used an 8-group classification. 
Aggregation is usually the result of a lack of information on detailed affiliations, or small 
sample sizes that hamper comparisons of disaggregated groups (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009: 349, 
Gay et al. 2015: 3). The degree of aggregation in defining groups is of key importance in 
 
 
accurately depicting the links between religion and socio-political attitudes: when large groups 
are used, differences within denominations are greater. Our thesis is that, even within highly 
disaggregated religious groupings, there will be substantial intra-group heterogeneity in 
attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues. Theoretically, levels of homo/heterogeneity could reflect 
several factors. First, high heterogeneity could be the product of higher within-group variation 
in socio-demographic traits: some religious groups are more diverse, e.g. in terms of the 
members’ age and education, which could lead to attitude heterogeneity (Gay et al. 1996). 
Second, low heterogeneity could stem from isolationist group practices: intense exposure to 
group teachings, strong penalties for deviance and/or reduced inter-group contact could 
increase attitude homogeneity (Scheitle and Adamczyk 2009). Third, high heterogeneity could 
reflect that the group’s attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues are in a state of ‘flux’, e.g. due to 
cognitive bargaining, strategic rebranding or generational changes: some group members may 
be transitioning towards adopting attitudes that are societally normative, while others may 
continue to adhere to viewpoints consistent with the group’s and society’s historical position 
(Sherkat et al. 2011). While, in this study, we do not aim to disentangle the causes of intra-
group heterogeneity in attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues, our data enable us to compare 
highly disaggregated religious groups (n=26) both in terms of their average attitudes and, 
critically, the degree of intra-group dissent. At a base level, we take heterogeneity in attitudes 
around LGBTIQ+ issues within a group as evidence of the existence of denominational 
subcultures (see Gay and Ellison 1993). Even if we are unable to explain the drivers of intra-
group divisions, quantifying them and studying their distribution across denominations 
constitutes a significant empirical contribution. The existence of internal fragmentation within 
denominations has important implications, as we will discuss later. 
Very few studies have grappled with these issues using quantitative data, and all of 
these relied on highly aggregated classifications of religious groups. In the US, Gay et al. 
 
 
(1996) found that the three most liberal religious groups (Jews, Episcopalians, and no religion) 
exhibited less homogeneity in their attitudes towards homosexuality than other social issues, 
while the attitudes within the two most conservative groups (Southern Baptists and 
Conservative Protestants) were highly homogeneous. Similarly, Sherkat et al. (2011) found 
that sectarian Protestants, the least progressive group regarding attitudes towards same-sex 
marriage, exhibited the least heterogeneity in opinion. Based on this, we hypothesise that: there 
will be substantial heterogeneity in support of equal rights for same-sex couples within 
different religious groups, but less so amongst groups characterized by greater separation 
from secular society and stronger sanctions against deviance (Hypothesis 3). We add to this 
limited body of work by expanding its reach to the Australian context, and using a more 
disaggregated classification of religious groups. 
Intersecting Identities: Religiosity as a Moderator in Attitude Formation Processes 
A second theoretical contribution of this study is to link conceptual discussions about 
intersectionality with scholarship on religion’s influence on attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ 
issues. A recent movement within the social sciences emphasises the importance of considering 
how intersecting identities – i.e., “the idea that individuals possess multiple, competing group 
identities that shape their life chances and attitudes and behaviours” (Read and Eagle 2011: 
117) – contribute to structuring individual attitudes and behaviours. Individuals develop 
opinions about socio-political issues based on their identity. Critically, identity is seen here as 
a multi-faceted and complex construct stemming from not just a single social location (such as 
social class, gender or ethnicity), but from multiple overlaps across a constellation of these. 
Religion is one important socio-structural factor contributing to individual identity and, as 
previously explained, plays an important role in attitude formation. An emerging theoretical 
approach within the sociology of religion based on intersectionality theory, labelled ‘complex 
religion’, argues that religion is not independent of other factors contributing to identity and 
 
 
should examined in interaction with these (Wilde and Glassman 2016). Religion is but “one of 
many identity categories that interact to produce mixed, unanticipated, and, sometimes, 
contradictory outcomes” (Read and Eagle 2011: 117). Scholarship assessing the role of 
religion in structuring attitudes has only recently and timidly begun to include this thinking 
into its ‘conceptual toolbox’ (Read and Eagle 2011; Wadsworth 2011; Wilde and Glassman 
2016).  
When individuals have different social identities, beliefs grounded in any one identity 
co-exist alongside, and compete with, beliefs grounded in other identities (Read and Eagle 
2011). We innovate by examining how religiosity and other important social locations intersect 
to structure attitudes about LGBTIQ+ issues. In advancing their ‘complex religion’ framework, 
Wilde and Glassman (2016) highlighted the importance of class and context in shaping the 
effect of religion. Following this lead, the additional social locations of interest that we consider 
are indicators of social class (self & parental education) and social context (place of residence 
& historical time). As argued before, religiosity is theoretically and empirically linked to 
unsupportive attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues (Adamczyk 2017). Yet people who identify 
as religious in today’s society are not a monolithic block, and often embody socio-demographic 
traits associated with supportive attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues. Previous scholarship has 
documented that higher levels of self and parental education lead to more supportive attitudes 
towards LGBTIQ+ people (e.g. through enhancing cognitive flexibility and exposure to 
humanistic and meritocratic ideals), and that individuals residing in urban areas are also more 
supportive (e.g., by intergroup contact with LGBTIQ+ people contributing to dispelling 
erroneous stereotypes) (Armenia and Troia 2017; Perales and Campbell 2018). In Australia, 
our own calculations using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey (study details below) indicate that, of people who identify with a religion, 
23% have University-level qualifications, 22% come from households in which both parents 
 
 
have University-level qualifications, and 62% live in urban areas. It remains theoretically 
unclear and empirically untested how religiosity and these socio-demographic traits interplay 
in attitude formation processes pertaining to LGBTIQ+ issues. Our thesis here is that religiosity 
will act as an ‘anchor’ that metaphorically moors the attitudes of individuals who possess other 
traits associated with supportive views (e.g. University qualifications) towards less supportive 
stances than their non-religious peers. That is, beyond the well-known direct effect of 
religiosity on attitudes, we pose that religiosity will also indirectly reduce support for 
LGBTIQ+ issues by reducing the liberalising effect on attitudes of other socio-structural 
factors. Similarly, we also pose that the trends towards more supportive attitudes towards 
LGBTIQ+ issues documented for society as a whole will be less pronounced amongst religious 
than non-religious people. This is based on the anti-ascetic hypothesis, which states that the 
negative effect of religiosity on support of a behaviour should be stronger when the behaviour 
has widespread societal support (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009). 
Surprisingly few empirical studies in the field have grappled with these issues. 
Wadsworth (2011) paved the way by underlining the importance of intersectional approaches 
to the study of religiosity and socio-political attitudes. She theorized how intersections between 
gender, race and religion critically shaped individuals’ ideological positioning and activism in 
California’s 2008 same-sex marriage debates around Proposition 8, a ballot initiative designed 
to eliminate same-sex marriage rights. Using 2006 US data, Read and Eagle (2011) showed 
that the correlations between religiosity and socio-political attitudes (including attitudes 
towards homosexuality) varied significantly along racial and gender lines. Similarly, Sherkat 
(2017) used 2006-2014 US data to demonstrate that the influence of religious identification 
and beliefs on support of same-sex marriage differed by gender and ethnicity. We expand on 
this limited body of evidence by undertaking a more systematic analysis of how religiosity and 
a different and wider range of social locations (self and parental education, urban area residence 
 
 
& historical time) interplay with each other to structure attitudes towards equal rights for same-
sex couples. Our guiding hypothesis is that religiosity will reduce the liberalising effect of other 
social locations on support for same-sex couples (Hypothesis 4). 
Diversity and Change: The Australian Religious Landscape  
The uniqueness of the Australian religious landscape and recent changes concerning LGTBIQ+ 
rights make Australia an interesting case study to test these theoretical premises. Australia’s 
religious profile is very different to those of the US or Europe (Bouma et al. 2010). While non-
Indigenous Australia has historically had a predominantly Christian tradition since the British 
colonial settlement, the Australian religious landscape has transformed significantly over the 
past 50 years (Bouma and Halafoff 2017). First, there has been a major trend towards religious 
diversification. Since the early 1990s Australia’s in-migration rates have grown, accompanied 
by a marked change in the most common sending countries: from European countries such as 
the UK, Ireland and Germany, to Asian countries such as India, China and Vietnam (Betts 
2015). Migrants brought their religions into Australia, and so religions such as Islam, 
Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism are becoming more prevalent. Today, Australia is a highly 
multicultural society with a highly diverse religious landscape (Bouma et al. 2010). The 2016 
Census revealed that 23% of the Australian population identified as Catholic, 13.3% as 
Anglican, and 3.7% as Uniting Church. A further 2.6% identified as Muslim, 2.4% as Buddhist, 
2.3% as Presbyterian & Reformed, 2.1% as Eastern Orthodox, 1.9% as Hindu and 1.5% as 
Baptist; combining a range of small Pentecostal and Evangelical groups produces a figure of 
3.7% (Bouma and Halafoff 2017). Altogether, Australia displays a very different religious 
profile than the US. As a result, the classifications of religious groups used in US research (e.g. 
the RELTRAND classification) are not appropriate to Australia. Second, since the 1970s, there 
is a marked trend towards secularization (Bouma 2011; Hughes and Fraser 2014). Recently, 
the percentage of people who did not identify with a religious group in the national Census rose 
 
 
from 22.6% to 30.1% between 2011 and 2016 (ABS 2017). Declines in religious affiliation 
have been apparent amongst the Christian groups, particularly Anglicans, Presbyterians and 
Uniting Church members, but also Catholics (Bouma and Halafoff 2017). Moreover, church 
attendance in Australia is substantially lower than in the US (Hughes and Fraser 2014). The 
combination of diversification and secularization makes Australia an important case study to 
examine the intersections between religious identity, religiosity and social attitudes. 
Furthermore, Australia is the only liberal democracy not to have a Bill of Rights that frames 
discussions of civil rights (Robertson 2009). While religious voices in the Australian public 
sphere have been consistent, the ‘tone’ of religious arguments in the public realm is shifting to 
more sectarian and counter-cultural themes. The national vote on same-sex marriage that took 
place in late 2017 provides a site for the examination of the role of religion in shaping the views 
on LGBTIQ+ issues amongst the Australian public. 
Religious Voices during the 2017 Australian National Vote on Same-Sex Marriage  
After several failed attempts by different governments to pass on bills enabling same-sex 
marriage, in August 2017 the Coalition Turnbull Government announced that it would conduct 
a national postal ballot to gather public opinion on the subject. The voluntary and non-binding 
ballot conducted between 12 September and 7 November 2017 asked all Australian citizens 
aged 18 and over to answer the question: “Should the law be changed to allow same-sex 
couples to marry?”. If a majority were affirmative, the Government would commit to enable 
the introduction of a private member’s bill to legalise same-sex marriage, which would then be 
subjected to a conscience vote in parliament. Over 79% of eligible Australians participated in 
the survey. The results, announced on 15 November 2017, showed support for the ‘Yes’ case 
(61.6%) vs. the ‘No’ (38.4%). In 133 of Australia’s 150 electorates, there was a majority of 
‘Yes’ votes. The factor that most strongly predicted the percentage of ‘No’ votes in a 
constituency was the share of people identifying with a religion (Livsey and Ball 2017). The 
 
 
bill to enable same-sex marriage passed with an overwhelming majority on December 8, 2017, 
and religious leaders expressed disappointment and the desire for (even more) freedom to 
discriminate against LGBTIQ+ people (Brolly 2017). 
Religious organizations were highly vocal, positioning themselves from the early stages of the 
debate. Their statements and movements confirmed the high heterogeneity in the official and 
unofficial stances of different groups regarding same-sex marriage and LGBTIQ+ issues. Very 
restrictive standpoints were taken by the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, which urged their 
followers to vote against same-sex marriage. Other groups officially affirmed their 
understanding of marriage as the union of a man and woman, and/or stated their support for 
the ‘No’ case – e.g. the Uniting Church, Seventh Day Adventists, Lutheran Church, Hillsong 
Church, and National Imams Council representing the Islamic community. In contrast, the 
Australian Buddhist Council and Australian Council of Hindu Clergy explicitly supported 
marriage equality. The debates revealed divisions within religious groups. An example was the 
Anglican Church, where an AU$1 million donation to the ‘No’ campaign made by the Diocese 
of Sydney was counterbalanced by strong support for a ‘Yes’ vote made by other senior voices, 
including the Dean of Brisbane. Similarly, a member of the Rabbinical Council of Victoria quit 
after the body released a statement urging people to vote ‘No’, other Jewish organizations such 
as the ARK Centre expressed their rejection, and the Council’s president ultimately apologised 
and retracted it. In addition, strong pro-marriage equality special purpose movements emerged 
from within groups whose official positioning was against – most prominently among 
Catholics and Anglicans (e.g. the Australian Christians for Marriage Equality).  
The debate around same-sex marriage elicited by the 2017 national vote constituted an 
opportunity for Australian religious organizations to take stock and reflect on their stances on 
LGBTIQ+ issues. It also provided them with an unprecedented chance to influence legislative 
change and social policy in this domain by deciding whether or not to influence voting amongst 
 
 
their members, and in which direction. Yet the average attitudes Australians who identify with 
different religious groups and the degree of intra-group heterogeneity remain poorly 
understood. The remainder of this paper provides unique empirical evidence on these issues. 
DATA 
Our analyses use data from the HILDA Survey, an Australian, household panel study which 
collects annual information from the same respondents since 2001 (Summerfield et al. 2016). 
The HILDA Survey features a complex, probabilistic sampling design, rendering it largely 
representative of the Australian population age 15 and older. Our sample is based on HILDA 
Survey data from waves in which information on support of equal rights for same-sex couples 
was collected and excludes observations in which respondents had missing information in one 
or more of the variables used in estimation. This yields an analytical sample of 44,794 
observations from 18,384 individuals, observed between one and four occasions. 
In the HILDA Survey, respondents are asked about their attitudes toward the rights of same-
sex couples through their agreement with the following statement: “Homosexual couples 
should have the same rights as heterosexual couples do”. The question was asked in waves 5 
(2005), 8 (2008), 11 (2011) and 15 (2015). To avoid social desirability bias, it was placed 
within a self-completion questionnaire instead of the face-to-face component of the study. 
Possible responses were on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ [1] to 
‘strongly agree’ [7] (mean=4.48; SD=2.29). From this, we constructed a dichotomous indicator 
of support of equal rights taking value 0 (‘no support’) if respondents fell into response options 
1-4 in the Likert scale, and value 1 (‘support’) if they fell into response options 5-7. This is our 
outcome variable of interest. Across waves, 52% of the respondents expressed support – with 
support rising markedly from 40% in 2005 to 66% in 2015. 
The HILDA Survey includes questions on religious identification, the importance of religion 
to one’s life, and attendance at religious services. These are our key independent variables. For 
 
 
privacy, all of these questions were included within the self-completion questionnaire. The 
questions were asked in waves 4 (2004), 7 (2007), 10 (2010) and 14 (2014). Hence, their values 
are carried forwards one year to those waves in which information on support of equal rights 
for same-sex couples is collected. This is statistically convenient, as it offers protection against 
potential biases due to simultaneity or reverse causation. Information on religious identification 
is coded to the Australian Standard Classification of Religious Groups (ABS 2016) at the 3-
digit level for Christian groups (except for Greek Orthodox, which is at the 4-digit level) and 
at the 1-digit level for other groups. This yields 26 different religious groups. In addition to ‘no 
religion’ (n=14,409 person-year observations, 32.17% of person-year observations), those with 
the largest sample sizes are ‘Catholic’ (n=10,097, 22.54%), ‘Anglican’(n=8,674, 19.36%) and 
‘Uniting Church’ (n=3,103, 6.93%), whereas those with the smallest sample sizes are ‘Brethen’ 
(n=60, 0.13%), ‘Seventh Day Adventist’ (n=110, 0.25%) and ‘Mormons’ (n=112, 0.25%). This 
largely corresponds to their presence in the Census. Information on the importance of religion 
to one’s life comes from a question asking respondents to tick one of 11 boxes, ranging from 
0 (labelled “one of the least important things in my life”) to 10 (labelled “the most important 
thing in my life”). The mean for this variable across all waves is 3.48 (SD=3.46), with the most 
prevalent categories being ‘0 of 10’ (n=13,907 person-year observations, 31.05% of person-
year observations), ‘1 of 10’ (n=5,082, 11.35%) and ‘2 of 10’ (n=4,103, 9.16%). A final 
question asks how often respondents attend religious services, excluding ceremonies like 
weddings and funerals. Possible responses are: ‘never’ (n=21,937 person-year observations, 
48.97% of person-year observations), ‘less than once a year’ (n=5,959, 13.30%), ‘about once 
a year’ (n=4,553, 10.16%), ‘several times a year’ (n=4,664, 10.41%), ‘about once a month’ 
(n=1,145, 2.56%), ‘2 or 3 times a month’ (n=1,257, 2.81%), ‘about once a week’ (n=3,921, 
8.75%), ‘several times a week’ (n=1,180, 2.63%), and ‘every day’ (n=178, 0.40%). 
In our multivariate models we control for a set of factors known to affect attitudes towards 
 
 
LGBTIQ+ issues – see e.g. Armenia and Troia (2017) and Perales and Campbell (2018). These 
include a continuous measure of respondent’s age, expressed in years (mean=46.16, 
SD=18.24), and dummy variables capturing respondents’ gender (53.57% female); sexual 
orientation, anchored in wave 12 – heterosexual (78.42%), gay/lesbian (1.14%), bisexual 
(1.00%); and a residual category for other answers (e.g. refuse, don’t know, etc.) and missing 
information (19.44%); highest educational qualification – degree or higher (23.92%), 
certificate/diploma (30.32%), Year 12 (15.15%), and below Year 12 (30.61%); ethno-migrant 
background – non-Indigenous Australian-born (77.62%), Indigenous Australian (1.90%), 
migrant from English-speaking country (9.94%), and migrant from non-English speaking 
country (10.55%); quartile of household, financial-year, disposable, regular income; socio-
economic background, measured by the number of parents with degree-level qualifications– 
none (32.48%), one (32.40%), two (24.17%), or unknown (10.94%); urbanity of area of 
residence – major cities of Australia (61.78%), inner regional areas (25.47%), and outer 
regional, remote and very remote areas (12.76%); and state/territory of residence. All models 
control also for survey year – 2005 (21.61%), 2008 (22.55%), 2011 (24.52%) and 2015 
(31.32%). A full set of descriptive statistics is shown in Online Appendix A.  
METHODS 
Our multivariate analyses consist of random-effect logistic regression models for panel data. 
These account for the nesting of observations within the same individuals, include a person-
specific random intercept (a random effect) to better account for unobserved effects, and 
estimate the coefficients on the explanatory variables using a weighted average of the between 
and within effects (Wooldridge 2010). To allow for non-linear relationships, the explanatory 
variables denoting religiosity are introduced in the model as sets of dummy variables. A second 
set of models tests for moderation of religiosity on support of equal rights by adding 
interactions between the variables capturing importance of religion and frequency of service 
 
 
attendance, and those capturing year of interview, self and parental education, and rural/urban 
residence. For parsimony, the religiosity variables in these models were aggregated into fewer 
categories. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Main Effects of Religious Identity and Religiosity 
In this section we discuss the results of multivariate random-effect logistic regression models 
estimating the impact of religious identification and religiosity on support of equal rights for 
same-sex couples in Australia over the 2005 to 2015 time period. The full set of estimates from 
these models is available in Online Appendix B. Here, we present key results visually, as 
predicted probabilities. 
<FIGURES 1 & 2 HERE> 
Figure 1 reveals vast differences in the degree of support of equal rights across religious groups, 
ceteris paribus. The highest support levels are observed amongst those who identify as Jewish 
(predicted probability [PP]=89.4%), other religion (PP=86.8%), other non-Christian 
(PP=85.0%), Buddhist (PP=78.4%) and multiple religions (PP=77.7%), as well as those with 
no religion (PP=81.6%). All these rates are over the sample mean support; 52.3% (horizontal 
dashed line), and the mean support by people identifying with a religion; 44.4% (horizontal 
dotted line). Support amongst Catholics (the largest religious group) was identical to the 
national average, even though there was strong teaching and direction to oppose. Anglicans, 
the second largest religious group, had the same level of support as the mean for those 
identifying with a religion. The lowest support is expressed by individuals who identify as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses (PP=0.4%), Brethren (PP=0.8%), Pentecostal (PP=6.1%), Islam 
(PP=7.4%), other Protestant (PP=12.1%), Churches of Christ (PP=17.1%), Baptist (PP=17.4%) 
and Seventh Day Adventists (PP=18.0%). Some of the largest groups, such as Catholics 
(PP=52.4%) and Anglicans (PP=43.8%), fall in the middle of the support distribution. 
 
 
Figure 2 reveals a clear gradient in support of equal rights for same-sex couples by 
religiosity, both when religiosity is operationalized as the importance of religion to one’s life 
(left panel) and the frequency of attendance at religious services (right panel). When religion 
is of little importance, support of equal rights is high. For example, the predicted probability 
of support is 79.4% amongst individuals who rate the importance of religion as 0 out of 10, 
71.6% amongst those who provide a score of 1, 63.9% amongst those who provide a score of 
2, and 59.5% for those who provide a score of 3. In contrast, when religion is of high 
importance, the predicted probability of support is much lower: 41.5% for a score of 7, 28.5% 
for a score of 8, 16.2% for a score of 9, and 6.3% for a score of 10. No predicted probability 
for a given importance score is significantly greater than that for a preceding score, although 
differences are less pronounced in the middle of the distribution (scores 4 to 6). Similarly, as 
attendance at religious services becomes more frequent, the predicted probability of support of 
equal rights for same-sex couples decreases. For example, this is 71.6% for those who never 
attend services, 51.0% for those who attend several times a year, 10.0% for those who attend 
once a week, and 3.2% for those who attend several times a week. Those who attend every day 
(PP=8.6%) are slightly more supportive than those who attend several times a week. This 
pattern of results holds also when all three sets of religious identity/religiosity variables are 
included in the same regression model (see Online Appendices C & D), and when the 
importance and attendance variables are specified as continuous-level predictors (Online 
Appendices E & F). The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with expectations 
and previous research (see Online Appendix B). 
Heterogeneity within Religious Groups 
Our second analysis quantifies and compares intra-group heterogeneity in support of equal 
rights for same-sex couples across religious groups. We also consider how such heterogeneity 
correlates with overall group support. To accomplish this, we use the full range of the original 
 
 
measure of support ranging from 1 to 7. Figure 3 is a scatterplot including each of the 26 
religious groups in the HILDA Survey data as an observation. It shows the association between 
the standard deviation (SD) in the 1-7 scale capturing support of equal rights (Y axis) and the 
mean support (X axis). This reveals several patterns of interest. First, we observe substantial 
heterogeneity in support of equal rights within groups: the average SD across all groups is 2.13 
(horizontal line), which amounts to 35.5% of the variable’s range. Second, there are large 
differences between religious groups in the SD of the support variable. For example, this is 
much lower for Brethren (SD=1.40), Jehovah’s Witnesses (SD=1.40) and Pentecostal 
(SD=1.93), than for Salvation Army (SD=2.35), Seventh Day Adventists (SD=2.36) and 
Mormons (SD=2.40). Third, comparatively lower SDs are observed for groups with both low 
and high means in support, and comparatively higher SDs amongst groups with mid-range 
support levels. 
<FIGURES 3 & 4 HERE> 
Religiosity as a Moderator 
Our final analyses consider whether and how religiosity moderates the effect on support of 
equal rights for same-sex couples of four other factors: historical time, self and parental 
education, and city residence. This is accomplished by including interactions between each of 
the religiosity variables and the variables capturing these social locations in multivariate 
random-effect logit models. For simplicity and ease of interpretation, we present the results 
graphically as predicted probabilities. Figure 4 shows the results for the measure of religiosity 
based on the importance of religion to one’s life. The pattern of results is similar in all four 
figure panels: the effect of the socio-structural factors is less marked at higher levels of 
religiosity, compared to lower levels of religiosity. That is, religiosity suppresses the 
liberalising effects of survey year, education, parental education and city residence. As an 
example, in the top-left panel of Figure 4, the difference in support between having University-
 
 
level education qualifications and below school Year 12 qualifications is 39.7 percentage points 
(93.0% minus 53.3%) when the importance of religion is 0 out of 10. However, when the 
importance of religion is 10 out of 10, this difference decreases to 4.1 percentage points (14.2% 
minus 10.1%). Similarly, the difference in support between having two degree-educated 
parents compared to none is 33.9 percentage points (90.6% minus 56.7%) when importance of 
religion is set to 0, but just 2.1 percentage points (11.4% minus 9.3%) when importance is set 
to 10 (bottom-left panel). Concerning city residence (bottom-right panel), the difference in 
support between living in a major city and an outer regional/remote/very remote area is 27.6 
percentage points (80.9% minus 53.3%) when importance is 0, but 4.7 percentage points 
(12.1% minus 7.4%) when it is set to 10. The top-right panel reveals that the gradient in support 
by importance of religion to one’s life has become more pronounced over time. Results for the 
frequency of attendance at religious services are remarkably similar (Online Appendix G).  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have used an Australian nationally-representative panel dataset spanning from 
2005 to 2015 to examine the associations between religious identification, religiosity and 
support of equal rights for same-sex couples. This study not only expanded the evidence-base 
on the religion/attitude link to Australia using more powerful data and methods than those 
deployed in previous scholarship, it also contributed theoretically to the field by demonstrating 
that the role of religion is multi-faceted. Simply considering its direct influences on attitudes 
withholds interesting and important information. To understand the full effect of religion on 
attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues, one must delve into its complexity by considering intra-
cluster heterogeneity (i.e., the existence of substantial variation in attitudes within, not just 
across, religious groups) and (ii) its intersection with other social locations (i.e., how religiosity 
affects attitudes indirectly by modifying the effect of other socio-structural factors). 
 
 
Consistent with expectations, results for our Australian sample revealed that identifying 
with a religion (Hypothesis 1a) and higher levels of religiosity (Hypothesis 1b) were associated 
with a lower likelihood of supporting equal rights for same-sex couples. This finding is hardly 
surprising, as it fits squarely with those from a well-developed body work in the US (Gay et al. 
2015; Whitley 2009) and emerging cross-national research (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; 
Adamczyk 2017), as well as with results from smaller, Australian community samples (Sloane 
and Robillard 2017; Smith 2016). These results go to show that strong religion/religiosity 
associations emerge also in a highly developed country in which progressive attitudes prevail. 
Also consistent with expectations, we found substantial heterogeneity in support of equal rights 
across religious groups (Hypothesis 2). Its extent was perhaps larger than anticipated. At one 
end of the distribution, fewer than 10% of Jehovah Witnesses, Pentecostals or Muslims 
expressed support of equal rights, compared to 80% or more of Buddhists, Jews, and people 
with multiple religions at the other end. The largest religious groups, Catholics and Anglicans, 
had support rates that fell within the middle of the distribution (with 52.4% and 43.8% support, 
respectively). This pattern of results is consistent with previous research documenting 
comparatively low rates of support for LGBTIQ+ issues amongst evangelical and sectarian 
Protestants in the US (Gay et al. 2015; Perry and Whitehead, 2016; Schnabel, 2016; Sherkat 
2017) and amongst Protestants and Muslims in cross-national samples (Adamczyk 2017). 
However, the degree of between-group dissimilarity in our Australian data appears larger than 
previously reported for previous US and cross-national studies. For example, in Adamczyk’s 
(2017) cross-national sample, the largest difference in disapproval of homosexuality, on a 0 to 
10 scale, was between Jews (7.6) and Protestants/Muslims (8.4). 
These divergences suggest that the coarse classifications of religious groups typically 
used in US and cross-national research may not do a good job in accurately depicting the 
diversity in attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ issues that exists across faiths. For instance, 
 
 
evangelical protestants are often found to have unsupportive views towards these issues in the 
US (see e.g. Gay et al. 2015; Perry and Whitehead, 2016). If we were to consider a similar 
group in our Australian data, the pattern of results would resonate with these findings. 
Combining all protestant groups with evangelical tendencies (in this example: Baptists, 
Presbyterian, Pentecostals, Brethren, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh Day 
Adventists), we would conclude that 15.6% of its members express support of equal rights for 
same-sex couples. However, when considering the separate subcategories, we would observe 
a great deal of variation in support: from 0.4% amongst Jehovah’s Witnesses to 29.3% amongst 
Presbyterians. In addition, using a detailed classification in a religiously diverse society such 
as Australia enabled us to provide evidence on the attitudes of individuals affiliated with non-
Western religions, which – due to small samples – is rare in US and cross-national research. In 
this regard, our results reveal comparatively low levels of support of equal rights for same-sex 
couples amongst Islamic respondents (7.4%), mid-level support by Hindus (40.9%) and high 
support by Buddhists (78.4%). 
In addition to expanding the evidence base to Australia, this study also made important 
theoretical contributions to the field. One such contribution was the consideration of intra-
group homo/heterogeneity in attitudes. Consistent with expectations (Hypothesis 3), we found 
large divergences in attitudes towards equal rights for same-sex couples within Australian 
religious groups. In some instances, there was more variation within than across 
denominations. While this pattern of results could be taken as a marker of religious 
incongruence (Chaves 2010) or syncretism (Woodford et al. 2012), it is also consistent with 
the idea that religious groups – even if highly disaggregated – host subcultures that differ in 
their moral stances about LGBTIQ+ issues (Gay et al. 1996; Sherkat et al. 2011). This is 
consistent with the internal fragmentation that was obvious within Anglicans and Catholics, 
 
 
amongst other groups, in the debates preceding the 2017 Australian national vote on same-sex 
marriage. 
In our survey data, there were also large and patterned differences from group to group 
in the degree of intra-group heterogeneity in attitudes. We expected to find that the more 
fundamentalist and sectarian denominations would exhibit the highest levels of intra-group 
homogeneity in attitudes. Our results were partially consistent with this postulation: groups 
such as the Church of Brethren, Pentecostals or Jehovah Witnesses – characterised by 
isolationist and exclusionary social control practices – were amongst those with the strongest 
consistency (and negativity) in views. This goes hand-in-hand with US evidence that religious 
groups least supportive of homosexuality (Gay et al. 1996) and same-sex marriage (Sherkat et 
al. 2011) display the lowest intra-group heterogeneity in opinion. Yet, somewhat puzzling, 
other groups characterised also by such practices did not. For example, amongst Mormons or 
Seventh Day Adventists low levels of support for equal rights co-existed with relatively high 
levels of internal fragmentation. Another puzzling finding were the comparatively high levels 
of intra-cluster homogeneity amongst some of the most supportive groups, such as Buddhists, 
Jews and ‘nones’. While this is consistent with earlier findings for the US by Gay and Ellison 
(1993) and Gay et al. (1996), the processes producing them remain unclear. Altogether, intra-
group heterogeneity was related to average support for equal rights in a curvilinear (concave) 
fashion: groups which expressed the lowest and greatest levels of support displayed 
comparatively more homogeneity in views than groups falling in the middle of the support 
distribution. Further research that unpacks these empirical regularities is warranted. 
Despite being sometimes unexpected, these findings have significant implications. For 
example, they help identify those Australian denominations in which deviating from normative 
views is in itself a normative situation, and those in which it is not. This is important because 
misalignment between personal and normative group beliefs, including beliefs about 
 
 
LGBTIQ+ issues, contributes to denominational disaffiliation (Vargas 2012). The findings also 
suggest that more research is needed to understand group dynamics within highly fragmented 
denominations, e.g. to understand which other factors play a role in structuring attitudes 
towards LGBTIQ+ issues amongst their members (see below). It is possible that cohort 
replacement or cognitive bargaining processes are at play, or that factors at the local 
congregation-level matter. Finally, the findings also serve as a reminder that successful 
management of religious diversity requires paying substantial, and perhaps increasing, 
attention to attitude heterogeneity within and not just across religious groups.  
A final theoretical contribution of this study was to adopt a ‘complex religion’ 
framework and examine not just whether religion matters (it does), but how religion matters. 
In doing so, we answered recent calls to pay close attention to how religion interacts with other 
facets of identity, social location and circumstance (Read and Eagle 2011), and to examine the 
multiple interaction effects between religion and other intersectional statuses using appropriate 
methodological techniques (Wilde and Glassman 2016). Consistent with our postulations 
(Hypothesis 4) and previous studies considering race and ethnicity (Read and Eagle 2011; 
Sherkat 2017), we found that religion not only has direct but also indirect effects on attitudes: 
at higher levels of religiosity, socio-structural factors such as self and parental education, city 
residence and survey year had little bearing on individuals’ views about equal rights. That is, 
higher degrees of religiosity increasingly supressed the liberalising effects on attitudes of 
embeddedness in these social locations. The reasons why the effect of religiosity trumps those 
of these other social locations are not obvious. A possible explanation is that individuals’ ability 
to decide on group membership is more limited for ascribed or difficult-to-change factors – 
such as social class and context – than it is for religious identification or participation (Read 
and Eagle 2011: 118). Further research delving into how attitudes towards LGBTIQ+ people 
are formed and negotiated when individuals hold religious beliefs and competing identities 
 
 
stemming from overlapping social locations is warranted. Either way, these findings are 
indicative that adopting a ‘complex religion’ framework is useful in gaining a deeper 
understanding of how religion intersects with other socio-structural factors in attitude 
formation processes. They also suggest that religious incongruence fallacies of the sort 
discussed by Chaves (2010) may emerge – at least in part – due to a failure to operationalize 
religion in its full complexity. As put by Read and Eagle (2011: 118), “incongruence can arise 
when ideas and beliefs grounded in one identity are trumped by behaviours seen as more 
pragmatic in another”. Religious beliefs and individual attitudes may appear more congruent 
when the role of religion is considered vis-a-vis that of other social forces. 
The moderation results pertaining to historical time are perhaps particularly important, 
as they offer a window into the likely role of religion in social change towards acceptance of 
LGBTIQ+ populations. The ‘moral communities’ hypothesis poses that, in contexts in which 
religious individuals are in the minority, religion should be less likely to shape attitudes – as 
religion constitutes a less integral part of the moral code (Adamczyk 2017). In contrast, the 
‘anti-ascetic hypothesis’ suggests that religion should have greater importance in structuring 
individual attitudes when a moral issue has more widespread support – as religious beliefs 
should be more likely to serve as a guide where there are not clear social sanctions (Finke and 
Adamczyk 2008). Our findings are more consistent with the latter proposition: religiosity 
matters more, not less, as Australians become increasingly more supportive of equal rights for 
same-sex couples. Differences in attitudes between religious and non-religious people were 
less pronounced in 2005 (when support rates were just 40%) than in 2015 (when support rates 
had grown to 66%). This suggests that, if the current trends towards secularization and societal 
acceptance of LGBTIQ+ rights continue, Australians who remain highly active in religion will 
progressively hold more countercultural views – a ‘sectarianisation’ of religion in Australia.  
 
 
In his presidential address to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Chaves 
(2010) argued that congruence between individuals’ religious beliefs and their outcomes is 
often erroneously assumed. Therefore, to make causal claims, the onus is on scholars to 
convince readers that outcomes do in fact follow from religious beliefs. While we refrain from 
making claims of causality, the alignment between the strong religious voices emerging during 
the Australian same-sex marriage national vote (Patrick 2017) and the statistical patterns found 
in the survey data clearly reinforce our case. Together, they suggest that Australians 
“consciously reflect[ed] on religion at decision-making moments” with religious leaders and 
groups actively campaigning to bring “certain identities or norms or expectations to mind at 
the moment of decision making” (Chaves 2010: 11). This brings us back into the role of religion 
in shaping social policy. 
It is clear that in the years leading to the 2017 Australian national vote on same-sex 
marriage religion was a major factor in the formation and expression of attitudes towards 
LGBTIQ+ people. Religions play four roles in social policy: objects, sources, critics, and 
implementers (Bouma 2012). In the 2017 Australian national vote on same-sex marriage, all 
four applied. Religious groups acted as if they ‘owned’ marriage and their interpretations of it 
were the object of legislative change. They were also source in that they sought to maintain the 
status quo. Religions were also critics, in that they felt that too much recognition of LGBTIQ+ 
rights had already been given, as well as implementers, in that they solemnise marriages and 
insist that faith-based organisations be allowed to discriminate. As for the 2004 US presidential 
debates around marriage equality (Bean and Martinez 2014: 398) and those surrounding 
Proposition 8 in California (Wadsworth 2011), Australian religious groups mobilized their 
followers in an attempt to dictate was what to happen in the wider society – violating the 
doctrine of religious restraint (Beyerlein and Eberle 2014). Our statistical models enable us to 
offer interesting counterfactuals; e.g., if everyone in Australia identified with a religion, the 
 
 
result of the same-sex marriage vote would have been to reject it. This stresses how in Australia, 
as in the US, religion remains central to the politics of moral values (Wadsworth 2011).  
To conclude, we find that religion remains an important barrier to the social inclusion 
of LGBTIQ+ people in contemporary Australia. Yet at the same time our findings indicate that 
simplistic equation of religion or religiosity with homophobia is misguided and ignores 
important nuances. Studies of and social commentary on the intersections between religion, 
religiosity and social attitudes need to acknowledge the large heterogeneity in worldviews that 
exists across, but also within groups. A large share of religious people support equal rights, 
which goes to show that religiosity and acceptance of LGBTIQ+ people are not mutually 
exclusive and in fact often go hand-in-hand. New empirical research that relies and builds on 
emerging conceptualizations of how religion intersects with other social locations to shape 
attitudes and behaviours is needed. Looking ahead, our findings paint a mixed picture about 
future trends in the social acceptance of LGTBIQ+ people in Australia: while the process of 
secularization is expected to become a major contributor to embracing equal rights, size 
increases in religions with highly opposing views will pose challenges. 
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 Figure 1. Predicted probability of support of equal rights for same-sex couples, by religious identification 
 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2005, 2008, 2011 & 2015. Based on estimates from Model 1 in Online Appendix B. Covariates held at their means random effects at zero. The horizontal, 
dashed line denotes the sample mean support level. The horizontal, dotted line denotes the mean support level excluding those with ‘No religion’.  
 Figure 2. Predicted probability of support of equal rights for same-sex couples, by importance of religion & frequency of attendance at religious services 
 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2005, 2008, 2011 & 2015. Based on estimates from Models 2 & 3 in Online Appendix B. Covariates held at their means random effects at zero. The 
horizontal, dashed line denotes the sample mean support level. The horizontal, dotted line denotes the mean support level excluding those with ‘No religion’. 
 Figure 3. Mean support of equal rights for same-sex couples (1-7 scale) by standard deviation of support, by identification 
 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2005, 2008, 2011 & 2015. Unadjusted results. The dashed lines denote the denominational mean SD and support level. The curvilinear grey line depicts 
their bivariate quadratic fit.  
 Figure 4. Predicted probability of support of equal rights for same-sex couples, by importance of religion interacted with selected factors 
 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2005, 2008, 2011 & 2015. Covariates held at their means random effects at zero. 
